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Abstract The first contingent convertibles (CoCo) were issued in 2009, but, to date,
the academic community has not given much attention to practical issues of pricing
them. Combining various aspects from existing theoretical and practical literature, this
paper first presents a CoCo pricing framework that allows a flexible and comprehen-
sible valuation of real-world equity or TIER-1 ratio-triggered CoCos. The model is
based on the assumption that the issuer’s total asset value follows a Brownian motion,
that book values reflect fair economic values in the case of financial distress, and
that there is a linear relationship between straight equity and TIER-1 ratios. The pric-
ing methodology is then applied to the Credit Suisse Buffer Capital Note issued in
February 2011.
Keywords Contingent convertible · Pricing · Equity ratio trigger
JEL Classification G12 · G13 · G18 · G21
1 Introduction
Recent turmoil in financial markets has revealed the fragility of modern financial insti-
tutions and the financial system itself. One result of the bursting of the US housing
bubble, the subsequent subprime mortgage crisis, and the recent sovereign debt crisis
has been a call for better capitalization of financial institutions. Furthermore, gov-
ernment rescue of several large banks brought the issue of so-called too big to fail
banks to the attention of regulators and the public. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2011) has already included related elements in Basel III, the new global
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regulatory standards on bank capital adequacy and liquidity. Compared to preceding
standards, the liquidity and minimum capital required by Basel III are significantly
higher. Obviously, raising additional equity capital is expensive for banks. To alleviate
this problem, various regulators (e.g., the Swiss FINMA) are showing an interest in
so-called contingent convertibles (CoCo) as an alternative to additional hard equity
capital.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses the extant
literature on CoCo pricing. In Sect. 3, the various constituent parts of a CoCo are
determined and a brief overview given of the few CoCo issues offered to date. Section 4
is concerned with the actual pricing framework. The basic concept of CoCo pricing,
which is actually valid for all structural valuation approaches, is illustrated by means
of a simple introductory example. This allows a clear picture and understanding of
the general mechanics of the pricing methodology. Subsequently, the CoCo pricing
framework to be applied in practice is elaborated and the sensitivities of the CoCo’s
price to changes in its three main design parameters—the coupon rate, the trigger
level, and the conversion ratio—are analyzed. In Sect. 5, the pricing methodology
is applied to the Credit Suisse Buffer Capital Note (BCN) issued in February 2011.
Because this note is one of the few existing CoCos, and not a special case, applying the
methodology to this CoCo enables identification and discussion of issues of practical
implementation. Finally, Sect. 6 provides a summary and the conclusion.
2 Existing pricing approaches
The main distinguishing feature of different contingent convertible bond forms is the
choice of trigger. Usually, this is either the share price of the issuing firm, as is the case
for classical convertibles, or an accounting ratio. Later in the paper, it is shown that, in
practice, conversion is usually coupled to some kind of equity ratio, and this is actually
the main issue when pricing CoCos. On the one hand, the question is how to model
the expected path of the trigger that determines the probability of conversion. On the
other hand, given a fixed conversion ratio, the payoff at conversion depends on the
corresponding market stock price. However, the stock price may not be in a perfect,
or any standardizable, relation with the trigger. This means that it is not possible to
perfectly determine the expected payoff at conversion, ex ante.
To date, most CoCo pricing approaches, such as Flannery and Mark (2009),
McDonald and Robert (2010), and Sundaresan et al. (2010), are very conceptual and
primarily focus on a rather qualitative analysis. Furthermore, these approaches rely
on stock price rather than on equity ratio triggers. Thus, their practicability is limited.
The first practical approaches to real-world valuations of contingent convertibles were
published in 2010. These approaches are of two main types: structural or derivatives.
Structural valuation models usually rely on the option pricing methodology of Black
et al. (1973) and Merton and Robert (1973). Those presented by Raviv and Alon (2004),
Pennacchi and George (2010), and Albul et al. (2010) assume that the bank’s total asset
value follows a Wiener process, while the value of the deposit, subordinated bond,
and equity capital tranches are modeled on the asset value. Pennacchi and George
(2010) additionally integrates jump-diffusion processes, which reflect the possibility
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of sudden large losses in asset value. In both models, triggering the CoCo depends
on the asset value or some book value to asset value ratio. Such structural approaches
model dependencies in the issuer’s capital structure and their impact on the triggering
probability and provides valuable insight into the corresponding mechanics. However,
determining the corresponding factors in practice may be extremely difficult. Neither
Pennacchi and George (2010) nor Albul et al. (2010) address this issue in detail.
Another structural approach is presented by Garcia and Joao (2011). He relies on the
CDS and equity swap valuation methodology elaborated by Brigo et al. (2005) and
applies their analytically tractable first passage model to price contingent convertible
bonds. The model outputs are then calibrated to the implied default probabilities from
the CDS market.
De Spiegeleer et al. (2011) present two derivatives approaches. Their so-called
credit derivatives approach is straightforward. Based on the distribution of stock price
movements, they calculate the triggering probability and the expected loss in the case
of conversion. This results in the credit spread necessary to cover the corresponding
investment risks. The alternative equity derivatives approach is basically a payoff
replication. The CoCo is separated into three parts: a zero-coupon corporate bond, the
coupon payments, and the block of shares received if converted. Each part is valued
individually. Valuation of the corporate bond part is rather simple; however, coupon
payments are modeled as multiple binary-down-in options and the block of shares as
a knock-in forward. Provided that triggering relies on a stock price trigger, valuation
of all parts is unproblematic. In practice, however, triggering usually depends on an
equity or TIER-1 ratio. The authors bypass this issue in both approaches by replacing
the equity ratio trigger level with a representative stock price level. This implies a
direct relationship between equity ratio and stock price. Furthermore, neither approach
accounts for callability nor, even more importantly, the impact of a CoCo issue on the
issuer’s capital structure, profitability, and, thus, the triggering probability. This impact
probably is negligible in the case of small CoCo issues but, based on the nominal
amounts of existing CoCos, this effect should be taken into account.
In conclusion, CoCo valuation faces two general issues: determining the probability
of triggering and determining the share price at conversion. Both issues arise from
the relation between actual and disclosed asset as well as debt values. The equity
ratio used as the trigger indicates the relative proportion of book equity capital to the
bank’s total book value of assets. These numbers are published in the firm’s financial
statements and follow certain accounting rules. On the contrary, the stock price or
market capitalization is the economical valuation of the expected present value of the
bank’s future net earnings. This implies that it equals the actual asset value less the
present value of all future liabilities. The equity ratio, which determines conversion,
is based on book values, whereas the stock price, which determines the payoff at
conversion, relies on actual asset values. Thus, the dependency between the equity
ratio and the stock price is determined by deviations between the disclosed and actual
values of asset and debt capital.
Obviously, the disclosed values depend in a positive way on their actual counterpart.
Under current accounting standards, deviations for debt capital should be small. While
the nominal amount of debt capital is perfectly reflected in the book values, future
interest owed may not be. This causes a certain downside bias in book debt values that
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can be corrected if the maturities and interest rate obligations are known. However, in
the case of banks, this is not always straightforward: deposits have no fixed maturity,
which means that they can be withdrawn at any time. Pennacchi and George (2010)
addresses this by assuming overnight maturity for deposits. However, hanging over
every bank is a sword of Damocles in the form of a bank run, which, if it occurs, may
have a sudden impact on the equity ratio; this situation is difficult to model. Looking at
the asset value side, accounting standards usually require disclosure either at market
value or at the lower of cost and market value. The latter approach is also called
the minimum value or caution principle. Correspondingly, disclosed asset values are
usually lower than actual ones and are more sensitive to downward turns in the actual
asset value than to upward ones. Thus, the equity ratio will indeed react in the same
way as the stock price to changes in the actual asset value, but given a comparably
high actual asset value, the reactions of the equity ratio will be strongly dampened.
This can be illustrated by a simple example. Assuming that a firm’s asset side
consists of a 50 % tranche disclosed by marking to market (MTM) and another 50 %
tranche disclosed following the minimal value principle (MVP). If the asset tranches
were bought for 50 each and their market prices are always identical, then the total
disclosed asset value will equal its actual counterpart only if the two parts’ values are
below 50. Above this threshold, only the MTM part will reflect all movements in the
asset value one-to-one; the MVP part is disclosed at market price only if that is lower
than its initial price. Correspondingly, the disclosed total asset value would be lower
than the actual. The higher the percentage of assets disclosed by MTM, the smaller
this effect and, thus, the difference between actual and disclosed asset values. Hence,
when modeling the conversion probability based on actual asset values, the model
will indicate conversion too late but will become more precise at lower trigger levels.
Returning to our example, if we assume a trigger level represented by an asset value
of 110, the disclosed asset value undercuts this threshold far earlier than the actual
one. If the level is 105, this distance is already much smaller and, given a level less
than or equal to 100, it is zero.
3 Constituent parts of a CoCo and current issues
Before addressing the question of how to price contingent convertible bonds, the
constituent parts of a CoCo are briefly described. This is followed by an overview of
recent CoCo issues by banks, which gives an idea of their use and design in practice.
3.1 Price determinants and design parameters
The fair price of a contingent convertible is determined by various factors, which
stand in interdependent relationships. Like every convertible bond, the CoCo can be
decomposed into a bond and an equity part. As long as the CoCo has not been converted,
it behaves like a normal straight bond paying a periodic coupon and redemption at
maturity. The risk of conversion could be compared to a default risk with no recovery
at all. If the CoCo is converted, the value of this bond part becomes zero. On the
other hand, in this case, the value of the equity part is no longer zero, but becomes
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Fig. 1 Constituent parts of a contingent convertible. The constituent parts of a CoCo can be assigned to its
bond part or its equity part. Besides this, they may have an impact on the probability of conversion. In this
figure, the design parameters that can be set at the issuer’s discretion are displayed as rectangles, whereas
circles represent given determinants
positive. Finally, the expected value of both parts chiefly depends on the probability
of conversion. If the probability of conversion is very low, the bond part accounts for
most of the CoCo’s total value, whereas the proportion of the equity part is low. With
a high probability of conversion, the opposite is true. Figure 1 illustrates the CoCo
pricing system.
Let us first look at the probability of conversion. A change in this probability has
an ambiguous impact on the CoCo’s total value because it depends on the direction of
the value transfer induced by conversion. If, for example, the conversion ratio is zero
and the CoCo bond writes down completely when triggered, a higher probability of
conversion would be undesirable for CoCo investors and the CoCo’s fair value would
decrease. On the other hand, a very high conversion ratio may cause a value transfer
to CoCo holders, so a higher probability of conversion would have a positive impact
on the CoCo’s value.
Maturity A bond’s maturity is usually defined at issuance. When these predefined date
are reached, the investor is repaid the nominal value of his/her investment. The longer
the remaining life of the CoCo bond, ceteris paribus, the higher the probability of
trigger and, therefore, the probability of conversion.
Trigger In the case of standard convertibles, conversion is usually coupled to the stock
price. Correspondingly, the stock price at which conversion is possible and the value
of the block of stocks the investor receives has a linear relationship. However, in the
case of CoCos, triggering may not rely on only the stock price, but on various types of
underlying values. Recent literature, such as Maes et al. (2010), classifies these into
three groups: market triggers, accounting triggers, and regulatory triggers.
Market triggers are the simplest and most straightforward. Here, triggering relies on
variables such as the stock price, credit spread, or CDS spread, which are defined by the
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markets and easily available any time. Based on the assumption of liquid and efficient
markets, all the variables mentioned have forward-looking characteristics and should
thus be plausible indicators of the bank’s financial soundness. In practice, though,
especially in critical situations, such assumptions may be inappropriate. For example,
in the recent financial crisis, the liquidity of CDS contracts was very low. Correspond-
ingly, even small trades can have a substantial impact on market prices, which may
no longer reflect the actual economic situation. Moreover, market triggers are vulner-
able to manipulation. As discussed by Flannery and Mark (2009) and McDonald and
Robert (2010), either the issuer or the CoCo holder may have an incentive to force
conversion if doing so will result in a positive value transfer to them.
Accounting triggers rely on accounting ratios, which give an indication of a bank’s
financial situation. All existing real-world CoCos have this type of trigger. They rely
on the so-called TIER-1 ratios, which are defined by rules of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision. In contrast to a normal equity ratio, which compares book
equity capital to the book value of assets, in the case of the TIER-1 ratios, the value
of assets is calculated by applying special risk weights to different asset types. For
example, less risky assets such as government bonds are assigned a lower risk weight
than below investment grade assets. This results in lower equity capital requirements
for high compared to low quality assets to reach a certain TIER-1 ratio. At first sight,
such book values do not depend on the liquidity or efficiency of the financial markets.
Due to standardized and audited accounting standards, the manipulation problem also
seems to be under control. Again, however, a look at the recent crisis raises some
doubt. In the last decade, accounting standards have shown a certain tendency toward
MTM rules (Plantin et al. 2008; Laux 2009). This means that if certain assets’ liquidity
becomes very low, as was the case for mortgage-backed securities, their book value
will decrease massively, probably to much less than their actual economic value. Thus,
book values also indirectly depend on market liquidity. Furthermore, between 2006
and 2009, even banks thought to be in a distressed state never published TIER-1 ratios
lower than 7 % (own analysis). This suggests that banks have a certain amount of
discretionary leeway in determining their TIER-1 ratios. Another issue is that some
banks have concerns about the potential behavior of large CoCo investors if conversion
becomes very likely (Ryan et al. 2011). Large institutional investors may try to hedge
the receipt of a large block of shares via massive short selling. This would drive the
stock price down and most likely severely restrict the bank’s capacity to act. Although
this would have no immediate impact on book values or the TIER-1 ratio, the bank’s
profitability would suffer and—if the CoCos were equipped with a regulatory trigger
as well—regulators could be induced to use their power to convert the CoCo.
Regulatory triggers give financial market supervisory authorities the discretionary
right to force conversion of the CoCo. These triggers are designed to help solve the
too big to fail problem. The mechanism provides the government with the opportunity
to avoid expensive bailouts, which may be necessary even if not indicated by the stock
price or an accounting ratio. However, regulators have to rely on certain indicators—
such as stock price or accounting ratios—as well. Correspondingly, and as described
above, regulators can be misled by manipulated indicators. However, the discretionary
nature of this trigger class makes assessing the probability of conversion and thus the
pricing of CoCos unpredictable, at least to some extent.
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As proposed by McDonald and Robert (2010), conversion of a CoCo could depend
on not only a single trigger, but also multiple ones. The design possibilities are nearly
endless, but combining a market or accounting trigger with a regulatory one seems
promising. Principally, there are two options for designing the interaction between
two or more triggers. An if-and design requires all trigger values to fall below the
trigger level before the CoCo will convert (Squam Lake Working Group on Financial
Regulation 2009). On the other hand, in the case of an if-or design, just one trigger
value falling below the trigger level causes conversion. However, regardless of the
potential combinations of multiple triggers, detailed information on the distribution
of the trigger values is needed to assess the probability of conversion. Ceteris paribus,
in any case, a higher volatility of the trigger has a positive impact on this probability.
Trigger level If the trigger falls below a certain barrier, which is called the trigger
level, the CoCo is converted into shares or written down. The trigger level is defined
at issuance and does not change during the lifetime of the bond.
In principle, the values of the bond and the equity parts of a CoCo can be considered
separately as conditional values. The probability of conversion determines how much
each part contributes to the CoCo’s total value. However, there are three factors that
have an impact on both the bond and the equity part.
Risk-free rate As is the case for every other financial product, the risk-free rate has an
impact on the present value of future cash flows generated.
Nominal amount If a CoCo bond matures without having been triggered, the investor
is paid a predefined redemption value. Usually, this value equals the nominal value of
the bond. However, the equity part relies on the nominal value of the CoCo as well.
The higher the nominal value, the more shares the CoCo investor receives in the case
of conversion.
Conversion fraction The conversion fraction defines the portion of the nominal value
that is converted into shares if the trigger is hit. If the conversion fraction is at its
maximum, which means 100 %, the full nominal amount will be converted according
to the corresponding conversion ratio. If the conversion fraction is lower than that,
only the corresponding part of the nominal amount is converted. The residual amount
is usually immediately returned to the investor.
The bond part of the CoCo is actually equal in structure to a standard straight bond.
However, instead of default risk and a certain recovery rate, there is conversion risk
and a specified conversion fraction. If there is no full conversion, the fraction redeemed
immediately can be interpreted as some kind of recovery. Thus, the only remaining
element that has an impact on the value of the bond part is the coupon rate.
Coupon rate Like any other bond, a contingent convertible can offer periodic coupon
payments to the investor. The coupon rate, which applies to the nominal amount, can
either be fixed at issuance or linked to some reference interest rate such as the Libor
rate. In addition, the issuer can define the frequency of coupon payments. In the case
of CoCos, coupon payments usually cease after conversion.
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The value of the equity part is, of course, determined by the number of shares the
CoCo investor receives in exchange for the fraction of the nominal amount converted
and the market value of the shares at conversion.
Conversion ratio/price The conversion ratio of a convertible bond determines how
many shares the bond investor receives in exchange for a specified amount of face
value in the case of conversion. This ratio also can be expressed as a conversion price,
which can easily be calculated using the following formula.
conversion price = nominal amount
conversion ratio
The conversion ratio can be either variable or fixed at time of issuance for the whole
lifetime of the CoCo.
When applying a variable conversion ratio, the investor receives a block of shares
with an actual market value equal to a predefined fraction of the nominal amount to
be converted. Usually, this fraction is 100 %, which means that the nominal amount to
be converted would have exactly the same value as the block of shares into which it is
converted. Correspondingly, the CoCo investor would neither suffer a loss nor make
any profit because no value transfer would occur between him/her and the shareholders.
Furthermore, this would mean that, theoretically, the share price at conversion would
have no influence on the value of the CoCo.
A fixed conversion ratio implies a fixed conversion price. If the market price at
conversion is lower than the conversion price, the investor will pay too much per share
and thus receive a block of shares worth less than the nominal amount for which it
has been swapped. The opposite is true for a market price higher than the conversion
price.
A third possibility is to combine variable and fixed conversion ratios. A variable
conversion ratio can be equipped with a predefined floor on the conversion price. For
example, as long as the stock price at conversion is higher than the floor price, con-
version occurs one-to-one and the investors receive the full nominal amount in shares.
If the stock price is lower than the floor, conversion will rely on a fixed conversion
price, equal to the floor, and the investors will suffer a loss. Depending on the level
of the floor, such a mechanism can be seen as either an alternative form of protec-
tion against excessive stock price manipulation or as a simple marketing instrument,
allowing unsophisticated investors to reduce the likely losses caused by conversion.
Share price at conversion The share price at conversion is only relevant for pricing a
CoCo if it is equipped with a fixed conversion ratio. The value of the block of shares
the investor receives is equal to the conversion ratio times the stock price at conversion.
In the case of a stock price triggered CoCo bond, the price at conversion is usually
equal to the trigger level, which means that the value of the block of shares received at
conversion is already known at issuance. In the case of alternative triggers, however,
it is much less clear what the stock price will be at conversion.
Similar to straight bonds and normal convertibles, most of the determinants of a CoCo’s
value are defined at issuance and do not change between then and maturity. The issuer
is free to set the maturity, coupon rate, conversion fraction, and conversion ratio, as
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well as the trigger and the trigger level. Hence, compared to straight bonds, there are
four additional design parameters.
3.2 Contingent convertible issues in practice
As of February 2012, only six CoCo issues had been made by banks worldwide, and
there had been a single definitive announcement of a future issue. The five issues by
Lloyds Banking Group, Rabobank, Zuercher Kantonalbank (ZKB), and UBS can be
considered special cases. Lloyds Banking did not make a public issue but, instead,
an exchange for existing preference shares, and the CoCos of ZKB, Rabobank, and
UBS do not convert but write down only. This leaves the Credit Suisse issue as the
first real and public CoCo issue. In the following, the six existing CoCos are briefly
characterized. Table 1 provides an overview of their determinants, as discussed in the
previous section.
Lloyds Banking Group In December 2009, the British Lloyds Banking Group issued
its first CoCos. The so-called Enhanced Capital Notes (ECN) were not issued publicly
but offered to the holders of certain TIER-1 and upper TIER-2 securities (generally
known as preferred shares). Lloyds offered specific ECN series for 52 existing types of
preferred shares. Finally, it issued 29 ECN series denominated in EUR and GBP, com-
prising a total nominal amount of GBP 7 billion and providing a 100–250 basis points
(bps) interest rate increase compared to the preferred shares for which they were con-
verted. Maturities ranged from 9 to 22.5 years and coupon rates from 6.385 to 15.000 %
for the EUR-denominated series and 7.588–16.125 % for the GBP-denominated ones.
All the ECN series were set to convert at a fixed conversion price of GBP 0.59 if the
bank’s TIER-1 ratio should fall below 5 %.
This first CoCo issue was part of Lloyds’ massive capital increase, the goal of which
was to allow the partly state-owned bank to exit the UK asset insurance program. Not
doing so would have meant that the government’s stake in the bank would increase to
more than 60 %. This may be one of the reasons why Lloyds was able to place the full
GBP 7 billion it intended in the CoCos.
Rabobank In contrast to Lloyds Banking Group and Credit Suisse, the Dutch Rabobank
is not a stock company but a federation of local credit unions, comparable to the
Raiffeisen banks in other European countries. Due to its organizational form, the
conversion of a CoCo into shares is not possible. Thus, the CoCos issued by Rabobank
are of a special nature in that instead of being converted into shares, the nominal amount
is simply written down to some extent. This can be viewed as a CoCo with a conversion
ratio equal to zero. So far, Rabobank has issued two slightly different types of CoCos.
In March 2010, it publicly placed a so-called Senior Contingent Note (SCN) with
a nominal amount of EUR 1.25 billion. This 10-year bond offers a fixed coupon rate
of 6.875 %. Triggering occurs if Rabobank’s equity capital ratio, which is defined as
the ratio of equity capital to risk-weighted assets, falls below a 7 % threshold. In such
an event, 75 % of the SCN’s nominal amount is written down, and the remaining 25 %
immediately returned to the SCN holders. Thus, the conversion fraction is 0.75. Note
that such a redemption structure will probably result in only a partial qualification
(or none at all) as TIER-1 capital under Basel III.
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Almost a year later, in January 2011, Rabobank issued another CoCo, labeled
Hybrid Capital Notes (HCN). This callable perpetual bond has a nominal amount of
USD 2 billion, and the first call date is 26 July 2016. Until then, the coupon rate is fixed
at 8.375 %, but thereafter it will be reset every 5 years to the US five-year Treasury
benchmark rate plus 6.425 %. In addition to an accounting trigger set at an equity cap-
ital ratio of 8 %, the HCN has a regulatory trigger. If triggered, a certain fraction of the
HCN will be written down and the residual amount will continue as a smaller HCN. The
exact write-down fraction is determined by the issuer in coordination with the Dutch
regulator, with the goal of restoring a sound capital basis. Such write-downs, which are
also known as loss absorption events, may occur more than once. Clearly, the structure
of the HCN is much more complex than that of the SCN and therefore pricing will be
more demanding. However, both bonds have a conversion ratio of zero and thus show
characteristics that are closer to those of preferred shares or subordinated bonds than
to those of CoCos. Nevertheless, due to their write-downs relying on trigger events and
not default, assessing their value requires the application of CoCo pricing approaches.
Credit Suisse In December 2010, Credit Suisse’s CEO, Brady Dougan, announced that
Credit Suisse planned to issue a first tranche of CoCos in 2011. Two months later, in
February 2011, Credit Suisse announced a definitive agreement with Quatar Holding
LLC and the Olayan Group, which would buy CHF 6 billion in CoCos to be issued
no earlier than October 2013. Only a few days later, Credit Suisse publicly issued its
so-called BCN, amounting to USD 2 billion. This 30-year security is callable by the
issuer starting in August 2016. Similar to Rabobank’s HCN, until that date, it pays a
fixed interest rate of 7.875 %; afterward, the coupon rate is reset every 5 years according
to the mid-market USD five-year Libor swap rate plus 5.22 %. Full conversion into
ordinary shares in Credit Suisse will take place if the bank’s TIER-1 ratio falls below
7 %. In addition, the Swiss regulator can trigger conversion at its own discretion.
Conversion itself relies on a combination of variables and a fixed conversion ratio.
The conversion price will be the higher of the floor price of USD 20 and the volume-
weighted 30-day average of Credit Suisse’s ordinary share price.
With the BCN, Credit Suisse was the first to actually publicly issue a real CoCo
that can convert into ordinary shares. At issuance, interested investors placed orders
amounting to more than USD 22 billion, a remarkable 11 times oversubscription
(Whittaker and Thomas 2012).
Zuercher Kantonalbank ZKB, a Swiss universal bank wholly owned by the canton of
Zurich, issued its first CoCo in January 2012. Similar to the case of Rabobank and
because ZKB is a public-law institution, conversion of the CoCo into shares is not
possible. Thus, triggering results in a direct write-down of the nominal amount and
thus this issue also must be considered a special case of CoCo.
The so-called Tier 1 Subordinated Bonds, with a total nominal amount of CHF
590 million, are perpetual and not redeemable at any time by the investors. Only the
issuer has the right to invoke early redemption, in the form of a call feature, from June
2017 onward. In addition, early redemption is possible in the event the bond will not be
treated as part of the Tier-1 capital by the Swiss regulator, or if any (expected) change in
the tax legislation renders ZKB exempt from national income taxes. Until this potential
redemption, the bond pays a coupon rate of 3.5 %, which is adjusted to the mid-market
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CHF five-year swap rate plus 2.98 % every 5 years from June 2018 onward. Another
special feature is that the payment of interest can be (partially) suspended even before
triggering. The issuer has sole discretion in this matter, whereas cancellation of interest
payments will be mandatory if ZKB fails to maintain regulatory capital requirements.
Triggering will occur if the bank’s TIER-1 ratio falls below a threshold of 7 % or at
the discretion of the Swiss regulator. The write-down amount, which will be either 25,
50, 75, or 99.98 %, will be determined by the issuer in consultation with the regulator,
with the goal of restoring a TIER-1 ratio of 7 %. If not written down completely, the
residual amount will continue as a smaller bond.
The ZKB issue combines various aspects from true CoCos, preferred shares, and
hybrid TIER-1 securities (e.g., as issued by UBS between 2005 and 2008), making
valuation of this security very challenging, which is probably why it is not and will
not be rated.
UBS The second major Swiss bank, UBS, issued a first contingent convertible bond
with a nominal amount of USD 2 billion in February 2012. In contrast to Credit
Suisse’s CoCos, the so-called Tier 2 Subordinated Bonds, on the one hand, feature a
low-level TIER-1 trigger of 5 % and, on the other hand, in the case of conversion, the
nominal amount of the CoCo is not converted to shares but written down completely.
Correspondingly, the UBS issue can be considered another special-case CoCo. Similar
to the Credit Suisse and ZKB CoCos, it has a regulatory trigger. The 10-year security
offers a 7.25 % coupon rate during the first 5 years, which will then be adjusted to the
mid-market USD five-year Libor swap rate plus the initial spread. At the same point
in time, the issuer will have a one-time right to redeem the CoCo early. Thereafter, it
will no longer be callable.
Considering the non-standardized structures of these instruments and their high
denominations (mostly between USD 50,000 and USD 100,000), it is not surpris-
ing that institutionals account for the largest segment of investors (Calomiris et al.
2011). As long as the issuer’s financial health does not deteriorate, investors such as
insurance companies, hedge funds, and pension funds may be expected to follow a
buy-and-hold strategy. This strategy is already evident in the low trading volume in
the existing CoCos. However, Standard and Poor’s (Brennan et al. 1977) estimate the
potential market volume to be more than USD 1 trillion.
4 A general framework for pricing equity and TIER-1 ratio-triggered CoCos
The CoCo pricing approach presented in this paper builds on separate valuations of
the CoCo’s bond and equity parts and thus uses elements from Raviv and Alon (2004),
De Spiegeleer et al. (2011), Garcia and Joao (2011), Pennacchi and George (2010),
and Albul et al. (2010). This results in a methodology that allows both a conceptual
understanding of and a practical approach to determining fair CoCo prices. The focus is
on equity and TIER-1 ratio-triggered CoCos, but the basic methodology is applicable
to stock price triggered bonds as well. Focusing on equity ratio triggered CoCos
avoids the issue of multiple equilibria in equity and contingent capital prices, which
was brought up by Sundaresan et al. (2010).
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4.1 Assumptions
The pricing framework is built on the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 The actual asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion.
An important assumption in much of modern finance is that equity or asset prices
follow a geometric Brownian motion. In the course of their work on pricing standard
convertible bonds, Brennan et al. (2010) and Ingersoll and Jonathan (1977) assume
that the asset value follows a Wiener process. Following Raviv and Alon (2004), this
idea is adopted for the total actual value of a company’s assets Aa , as shown in Eq. 1,
with Z being a Wiener process.
dAa = μAa Aa dt + σAa Aa dZ (1)
In contrast to De Spiegeleer et al. (2011), who assume that equity prices follow a
Brownian motion, this approach allows capturing the impact of default risk. Default
is defined as occurring if the asset value falls below the value of liabilities or a certain
fraction of it. Because a geometric Brownian motion will never fall below zero, such a
default condition cannot be implemented when assuming that stock prices themselves
follow a Brownian motion. For the same reason, Garcia and Joao (2011) also makes
this assumption. An additional aspect is the possible payment of dividends. On the
one hand, the corresponding capital outflows would reduce μA, which determines the
conversion probability. On the other hand, the CoCo investor would receive dividends
immediately after conversion. However, it is reasonable to assume that dividends
decrease with lower asset values and would probably be very low after conversion (De
Spiegeleer et al. 2011). Thus, in the case of a very high dividend rate upon issuance
of the CoCo, a corresponding correction factor may be added to the asset value path,
whose value changes periodically depending on the actual total asset value. For the
sake of clarity, the pricing framework presented here does not address this issue in any
more detail.
Assumption 2 The actual asset value equals the sum of the firm’s market capitaliza-
tion and its actual value of liabilities.
The market capitalization, which is not necessarily equal to the book value of equity,
is defined as the difference between the book value of debt capital and the actual asset
value. If the asset value falls below the value of debt, default occurs and the stock price
is zero. The book value of liabilities mainly consists of their redemption value, which
is usually well known. It is only future interest rate payments that are not fully known.
Thus, the book values should reflect the actual present value of liabilities quite well.
In contrast, the book value of assets is often biased by minimum value accounting
principles, hidden reserves, and the existence of intangible assets. Given efficient
markets, however, these aspects should be incorporated into the market capitalization
of a firm. Thus, the actual asset value should be approximated by the sum of the market
value of equity and the book value of liabilities.
Assumption 3 The worse the financial condition of the firm, the more similar the
actual and disclosed values of assets.
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Following the argument presented in Sect. 2, the lower a firm’s actual asset value
Aa , the more it will converge to the disclosed asset value Ad .
lim
Aa→0
Aa = Ad (2)
Assuming that there is no difference between actual and disclosed values on the
liability side, the equity ratio implied by the actual asset value will converge to the book
equity ratio. This means that the worse a firm is doing, the better its implied equity ratio
will approximate the disclosed one. However, disclosed values are usually published
quarterly and exhibit a certain lag due to accounting standards. Furthermore, banks
often hold assets that are very illiquid and the book values of these kinds of assets
rely on banks’ internal valuation models, giving banks some discretion in valuation
decisions. Therefore, a bank near bankruptcy is likely to feature a higher disclosed
than implied equity ratio.
A brief analysis of the price-to-book ratios of 56 US financials from the beginning
of 2006 to the end of 2011 is presented in Fig. 2. During the recent financial crisis,
price-to-book ratios significantly converged to one. This is confirmed by a simple
linear regression of the price-to-book ratios against normalized market capitalization,
which shows a degree of explanatory power (R2) of 44.6 %. In the first half of 2009,
price-to-book ratios were even significantly below 100 %. This is either a sign of
too-high disclosed asset values or a market undervaluation of assets due to illiquid
or imperfectly efficient markets. However, this supports the convergence assumption
and justifies the simplification Ad = Aa for CoCos with sufficiently low trigger levels
since, in such cases, conversion occurs only if the issuer is in bad financial condition.
This assumption of convergence allows a hypothetical actual equity ratio to be used,
which depends on the actual asset value and its well-defined return distribution. Within
the range of low asset values, this actual equity ratio will converge to the disclosed
equity ratio that determines conversion.
Assumption 4 The equity and the TIER-1 ratio are in a linear relationship.
As discussed above, in most of the extant CoCos triggering is not linked to the
issuer’s straightforward equity ratio but to the TIER-1 ratio. Calculation of this ratio
is determined by the national regulators, who usually follow the guidelines set out by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Aside from the value of equity capital,
the TIER-1 ratio depends on the so-called risk-weighted assets. Each type of asset is
assigned a specific risk weight, which should reflect the firm’s exposure from holding
such an asset. The risk weight for high-quality government bonds is 0 %, whereas that
for a speculative grade corporate bond is higher than 100 %. Thus, there is no fixed
relation between the equity ratio and the TIER-1 ratio. For example, assume that there
are two banks, A and B, both with a total book asset value of USD 100 and a total
equity capital equal to USD 10. Thus, both banks have an equity ratio of 10 %. Now
assume that bank A is a classic retail bank, mainly involved in savings and loans,
with an average risk weight of 50 %. Bank B, on the other hand, is an investment
bank, which is a much riskier business and thus has a higher average risk weight of
150 %. Thus, although they have the same equity ratio, bank A’s TIER-1 ratio is 20 %
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Fig. 2 Box-plot of price-to-book ratios of 56 large US financials, 2006–2011. Source: own calculations,
Bloomberg
whereas bank B’s is only 6.7 %. However, one can assume that as long as a firm does
not change its business strategy and/or area completely, the asset structure will remain
similar over time. Therefore, there should be a linear relationship between the equity
and TIER-1 ratios (Garcia and Joao 2011).
TIER-1 ratio = α + β equity ratio +  (3)
This assumption is supported by an empirical analysis of equity ratios based on
the same data set of US financials used earlier. To allow comparability between dif-
ferent types of banks, the equity ratios were normalized using the average of equity
ratio/TIER-1 ratio. It is obvious from Fig. 3, which plots the TIER-1 ratios against the
normalized equity ratios, that there actually is such a linear dependency. Furthermore,
ordinary linear regression results in a highly significant dependence of the TIER-1
ratios on the normalized equity ratios and exhibits an R2 of 63.3 %.
These findings suggest a simple way to transform implied equity ratios into implied
TIER-1 ratios, which can be used to model the triggering probability. Of course, due
to the way TIER-1 ratios are modeled and, ultimately, the fact that a firm can change
its asset structure, this assumption involves a relatively high degree of uncertainty.
Nevertheless, it is a valid approach for modeling this partly discretionary variable.
4.2 Introductory example
The conceptual foundation for pricing CoCos can be shown nicely using a bino-
mial tree model. As mentioned above, the CoCo consists of a bond and an equity
part. The expected present values of both depend on the probability of conver-
sion. For the sake of simplicity, in this introductory example conversion does not
depend on the TIER-1 ratio but on the straight equity ratio (er) as defined below.
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Fig. 3 Dependence between disclosed equity and TIER-1 ratios of 56 large US financials, 2006–2011.
Based on disclosed data, the equity ratio is normalized using the average (equity ratio/TIER-1 ratio) across
all firms, allow cross-company analysis. Source: own calculations, Bloomberg
This ratio indicates the proportion of book equity capital Ed in the bank’s disclosed
total assets Ad . Book equity capital is equal to disclosed total assets less disclosed
debt capital Dd . Furthermore, the disclosed asset value is assumed to equal the actual
one and thus the corresponding subscripts are omitted in the explanation below.
er = E
A
= A − D
A
(4)
It is assumed that the asset yield μA is paid continuously over time and is equal to
the risk-free interest rate r f under risk neutrality. The assets are refinanced through
senior debt capital with a nominal value of D, a CoCo bond with face value C , and
an equity tranche E . The CoCo triggers if the equity ratio falls below er∗ and the
conversion price is cp.
Now, the distribution of the asset value can be translated into a binomial tree follow-
ing Cox et al. (1979). A simple four-period example is used to illustrate the mechanics
of pricing CoCos. At the starting point of the tree, the bank has the following capital
structure: a total actual asset value A with a value of 100, debt capital D amounting
to 80, and a CoCo tranche of 10. Correspondingly, the equity capital E , which is just
one share, is worth 10. During each period, A will either increase by 5 % or decrease
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Fig. 4 Asset value distribution and state probabilities in a four-period binomial model. The binomial tree is
based on the propositions of Cox et al. (1979). The initial asset value A is 100; the up and down factors are
1.05 and 1.0476, respectively. Corresponding probabilities are 48.8 and 51.2 %. The total amount of debt
amounts to 90. If the asset value falls below 94.7 (equals an equity ratio of 5 %) the CoCo will be triggered
immediately. The lower partial tree presents the states and probabilities p given prior and actual triggering
by 4.76 %, with probabilities 0.488 and 0.512, respectively. For convenience, we set
the risk-free interest rate to zero.
Conversion of the CoCo bond depends on the equity ratio, and the trigger level is
5 %. Hence, given a static total nominal amount of debt and CoCo capital of 90, a
5 % equity ratio corresponds to an asset value of 94.7. Thus, the CoCo will convert
if the asset value falls below this threshold. In such a case, given a conversion price
(cp) of 10, the CoCo will be converted into exactly one share, which means that the
former sole shareholder and the CoCo investor will have equal shares in the bank. The
tree of state probabilities can now be separated into two conditional ones. The upper
partial tree in Fig. 4 presents the probabilities given no conversion, and the lower
tree the probabilities given present or prior conversion. We can see that, at certain
nodes, such as the middle one in the last period, the CoCo can either be triggered or
not.
Now we turn to valuation of the bond and equity parts of the CoCo. The value of
the bond part primarily depends on the redemption value of the CoCo and its coupon
payments. Similar to the equity derivative approach of De Spiegeleer et al. (2011),
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Fig. 5 Fair CoCo values. Based on the binomial tree presented in Fig. 4, a CoCo with redemption value
of 10 and a coupon of 0.5 (paid every second period if not triggered) exhibits the fair values VC shown at
the nodes that do not involve prior or actual triggering
the expected redemption and coupon payment are examined separately. If the CoCo
matures in the last period, the probability of full redemption at maturity is 60.7 %.
Thus, the expected redemption value of the CoCo is 60.7 % × 10 = 6.07. Given a
two-period coupon frequency, a first coupon will be paid at the end of the second
period and a second one at the time of redemption. We assume a coupon rate of 5 %
or 0.5 per two periods and that coupons are paid only if the CoCo is not converted.
Thus, the expected value of the first coupon payment is 73.8 % × 0.5 = 0.37 and the
value of the second is 60.7 % × 0.5 = 0.30. This results in an expected coupon value
of 0.67 and a total value of the bond part of 6.74.
Determining the value of the equity part is done similarly. Relying on the relation
between the values of assets and equity, as presented above, after conversion of the
CoCo, the equity is always worth the value of the assets minus the outstanding debt
of 80. At the end of the last period, this difference will be 20 with a 6.2 % probability,
10.70 with a 26.2 % probability, or 2.27 with a 6.9 % probability. As explained above,
in the case of conversion, the CoCo investor is assigned exactly 50 % of the bank and
its value. Thus, the equity part of the CoCo is worth 2.10.
Adding up the values of all the parts, the total expected value of the CoCo is 8.85 at
the first node. Hence, if the issue took place at the root of the tree and yielded the full
10, the CoCo was overpriced. However, after calculating the fair CoCo prices at all
nodes, as shown in Fig. 5, it can happen that the CoCo is worth more than its nominal
value.
4.3 CoCo pricing in practice
The pricing framework presented in this paper consists of the following three main
steps:
1. determination of the issuer’s actual asset value and the corresponding volatility;
2. assessment of the relationship between the actual equity ratio and the TIER-1 ratio;
3. valuation of the CoCo’s redemption, coupon, and equity parts.
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Table 2 Data necessary for pricing a TIER-1 ratio triggered CoCo
Symbol Description Form
Aa Actual asset value of the issuer Historical time series
σAa Volatility of returns on the issuer’s actual asset value Current value
Dd Disclosed debt capital of the issuer Historical time series
T 1 Issuer’s TIER-1 ratio Historical time series
r f,i Risk-free interest rate curve Current values
C Redemption value Single value
cC Coupon ratio Single value
cp Conversion price Single value
cf Conversion fraction Single value
er∗/T 1∗ Trigger level of equity or TIER-1 ratio Single value
T Remaining time to maturity Current value
Additional historical time series of the market value of equity and/or credit spreads may be needed to
determine Aa and σAa
In the first step, the issuer’s actual asset value Aa and its volatility σAa need to be
determined. Given a sufficiently large time series of actual asset values Aa , disclosed
debt capital Dd , and the TIER-1 ratio T 1, the second step involves analyzing the
relationship between the actual equity ratio and the TIER-1 ratio. This allows the
translation of the triggering criterion into a corresponding asset value threshold A∗a .
The third step is the actual valuation, for which the CoCo is divided into three parts:
redemption, coupon, and equity. Each is valued separately and their sum represents
the CoCo’s fair value. Table 2 summarizes all the data and/or information necessary
for pricing a TIER-1 ratio triggered CoCo.
4.3.1 Determination of actual asset value and corresponding volatility
When implementing a pricing approach built on the assumptions above, the question
arises as to how to measure the asset value and volatility. Because such values are not
directly observable, one has to rely on asset values and volatilities implied by certain
indicators, such as the stock price or credit spreads. Here, we first focus on deter-
mination of implied asset values and then present various approaches for calculating
implied asset volatilities.
The simplest approach for estimating the total actual value of assets is to rely on
book values or, in other words, the disclosed total asset value Ad . However, follow-
ing Assumption 3, these values are plausible only if the firm’s financial condition is
poor. In contrast, and in accordance with Assumption 2, the implied asset value can
also be based on the sum of disclosed total debt capital and market capitalization
Dd + Ea = Aa . Alternatively, following Black et al. (1973) and Merton and Robert
(1974), the market capitalization could be seen as the actual value of a call option
on the firm’s equity capital. The strike price of such a call equals the company’s lia-
bilities due at a certain point in the future. Given adequate historical data on market
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capitalization and capital structure, this results in an implied asset value as well. A sim-
ilar methodology, discussed in detail by Bharath et al. (2004), is chosen by Moody’s
KMV (Crosbie et al. 2003) in the context of assessing implied default probabilities.
On the other hand, and as presented by Nikolova and Stanislava (2003), this approach
can be implemented by relying on credit or CDS spreads.
There are also multiple ways of determining implied volatility. A simple method is to
rely on the volatility of the market capitalization Ea . Based on the boundary condition
of Merton and Robert (1974), the implied asset volatility can then be expressed as a
function of Ea , its historical variance, and the total book value of liabilities Dd .
σAa = σEa
Ea
Aa
= σEa
Ea
Ea + Dd (5)
This simple approach implies a perfect correlation between market capitalization
and total asset value. Correspondingly, the triggering asset value can be translated
directly into a triggering market capitalization or stock price. De Spiegeleer et al.
(2011) choose this approach in their pricing methodologies. Alternatively, the credit
markets can be used to determine asset volatility. The price of debt capital and/or the
credit spreads directly reflect the default probability and therefore the asset volatility
as well. Schonbucher and Philipp (2003) discusses CDS pricing in detail. Here, the
mechanics are presented in a simplified manner. It is assumed that default is possible
only at the contract’s maturity. If default was possible at any point during the CDS’s
lifetime, one would have to rely on the work of Su et al. (2009) in a similar way to what
is shown later in Eq. 12. When relying on CDS spreads, the default probability PDCDS
implied by the 1-year CDS spread in basis points, sCDS,1 year, can be determined as
shown in Eq. 6. The average recovery rate of the underlying, rr, has to be considered
as well.
PDCDS = sCDS,1 year/10, 0001 − rr (6)
Given that default occurs if the asset value A falls below the total amount of debt D
and (x) being the cumulative distribution function of a normal standard distribution,
the probability of default can now be derived as shown in Eq. 7. When doing so, one
can rely either on the actual asset value implied by the book value Ad or that implied
by the equity markets Aa .
PDCDS = 
⎛
⎝ ln
(
Dd
A
)
− (r f + 0.5σ 2A)
σA
⎞
⎠ (7)
By combining Eqs. 6 and 7, the implied asset volatility can be found. However,
this approach is subject to a major problem. As mentioned above, the maturity of the
CDS may be chosen to be 12 months and therefore the amount of debt capital the firm
must be able to repay at this point in time has to be defined. To this point, it has been
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assumed that the firm must be able to repay the total amount of debt. In practice, of
course, this so-called default point will be smaller than the total amount of liabilities.
The default point may lie somewhere between the short- and the long-term liabilities.
In the special case of banks, studies such as Ronn et al. (1986) set the default point
between 95 and 98 % of total liabilities. Considering that banks’ liabilities usually
consist to a large extent of deposits and short-term liabilities to other banks, such
values seem plausible.
In summary, it is difficult to make a clear-cut assessment of the different approaches
to determining implied asset values and volatility. Output from each approach may
vary substantially and the precision of the results will mainly depend on the corre-
sponding market efficiency. However, this is an issue that affects every default and/or
debt valuation model. Choosing the right methodology is probably one of the main
difficulties in pricing CoCos.
4.3.2 Assessment of relationship between the actual equity ratio and the TIER-1 ratio
Assessing the relationship between the actual equity ratio (er) and the TIER-1 ratio
T 1 basically relies on some type of regression analysis. The very basic approach is to
model the dependency of T 1 on er using a linear regression model. Better results may
be achieved by applying more sophisticated methods and/or adding more explanatory
variables. For reasons of simplicity, in the following, it is assumed that er = T 1.
4.3.3 Valuation of the three CoCo parts
Once the necessary information about the actual asset value, its volatility, and the
relationship between the equity and TIER-1 ratios has been collected, it becomes
possible to value the CoCo. One of the main differences between the introductory
example and the situation in practice is that, in real-life, CoCos that rely on a book
value trigger can usually convert only on or just after reporting dates, which usually
occur just four times per year, that is, at the end of every quarter. These points in time
will be called conversion points in this paper. Correspondingly, in the period between
two conversion points, the actual equity ratio could fall below the trigger level without
triggering the CoCo. The same is assumed for default, which also can only occur at
such conversion points. Given that the following calculations are completely based on
actual values, the corresponding subscripts are omitted for ease of interpretation.
Following the first three assumptions, the trigger for the equity ratio, er∗, can be
translated into a trigger for the asset value, A∗, as shown below. If the CoCo relies on
the bank’s TIER-1 ratio for its trigger, then this equation can be combined with the
corresponding formula that determines the relationship between the equity ratio and
the TIER-1 ratio, as shown in Eq. 3. For the sake of clarity, we assume in what follows
that the TIER-1 ratio is exactly equal to the straight equity ratio.
A∗ = L
1 − er∗ (8)
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Given the asset yield μA, which is still assumed to be equal to the risk-free rate
r f , and volatility σA, we can determine the cumulative distribution function (cdf)
of the corresponding Brownian motion. Equation 9 reflects the probability that the
asset value is greater than A∗ at a specific point in the future, t1. This is equal to the
probability that the equity ratio lies above its trigger at t1, causing the CoCo to trigger.
P[At1 ≥ A∗] = 1 − 
⎛
⎝ ln(
A∗
At0
) − μa(t1 − t0)
σA
√
t1 − t0
⎞
⎠ with μa = μA − 0.5σ 2A (9)
If t1 is the remaining time to the next conversion point, Eq. 9 reflects the probability
that the CoCo is not triggered. However, the lifetime of a CoCo usually covers more
than just one conversion point and, therefore, probabilities of conversion need to be
determined for all conversion points until maturity. Thus, if t2 is the second conversion
point, the probability that the CoCo has not converted at t2 is conditional on there
having been no prior conversion at t1. Let us now assume that from t1 on, the time
between two conversion points is always identical and equal to t.
t = tn − tn−1 (10)
With φ(. . .) being the probability distribution function (pdf) of a standard normal
distribution, the probability that a CoCo has not been triggered up to and including
any given conversion point tn is given by Eq. 11.
P
[
Atn ≥ A∗|Atn−1 , . . . , At1 ≥ A∗
]
=
∞∫
rA1
∞∫
rA2
· · ·
∞∫
rAn
φ (x1) φ (x2) . . . φ (xn) dxn . . . dx2 dx1 (11)
rA1 =
ln
(
A∗
At0
)
− μat
σA
√
t
rA2 =
ln
(
A∗
At0 exp(μa t+σA
√
tx1)
)
− μat
σA
√
t
. . .
rAn =
ln
(
A∗
At0 exp((n−1)μa t+σA
√
t(x1+x2+···+xn−1))
)
− μat
σA
√
t
This conditional cdf requires the calculation of an n-times integral. Solving numer-
ically will be very time consuming and may be substituted for by a binomial or Monte
Carlo approach. De Spiegeleer et al. (2011) circumvent this problem by allowing con-
version at any point in time up to tn . They rely on Su et al. (2009), who developed an
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analytical solution to determine the corresponding probabilities. If t is close to zero,
Eq. 11 reduces to the cdf presented in Eq. 12. This greatly simplifies the calculations
but is the source of a major issue as well. If conversion is possible at any time, the share
price at conversion will always be identical to the trigger level. However, if conversion
is possible only at the end of every quarter, the share price and/or the asset value may
lie far below the trigger value. Therefore, using the simplified approach will probably
bias the CoCo’s value.
P[Atn ≥ A∗|Atn−1 , . . . , At1 ≥ A∗, t = ]
= 1 − 
⎛
⎝ ln(
A∗
At0
) − μa(tn − t0)
σA
√
tn − t0
⎞
⎠
−
(
A∗
At0
) 2μa
σ2

⎛
⎝ ln(
A∗
At0
) + μa(tn − t0)
σA
√
tn − t0
⎞
⎠ (12)
However, the subsequent analysis will rely on Eq. 11. Given the corresponding
survival probabilities for every conversion point t , which henceforth called pt , both the
expected redemption value and the coupon value of the CoCo can easily be determined.
The redemption value of the CoCo can be computed straightforwardly. If the asset
value has never gone below the conversion threshold by the time maturity is reached,
the CoCo will be redeemed at par. Thus, the redemption value Vredemption is equal
to the present value of the survival probability at maturity, pT , times the redemption
value C .
Vredemption = pT C e−r f,T (13)
The expected present value of the coupon payments, Vcoupon, is calculated similarly.
The coupon is paid to the investor only if the CoCo has not yet been converted.
Therefore, the expected present value of each coupon payment depends on the survival
probability at the previous conversion point pt,pcp, the percentage coupon ratio cC ,
and the corresponding risk-free rate r f,t . The sum of all such present values is equal
to the coupon value of the CoCo.
Vcoupon =
∑
pt,pcp cC C e−r f,t (14)
Pricing the equity part is more difficult. The actual win or loss the CoCo investor
experiences in the case of conversion depends, first, on the conversion price (cp) and
the conversion fraction (cf) and, second, on the number of shares outstanding before
conversion s. The number of new shares issued due to conversion is equal to the
nominal amount of the CoCo adjusted by the conversion fraction and divided by the
conversion price. Omitting the conversion fraction for reasons of clarity, this means
that the share price will be additionally diluted and lowered. Thus, the share price
after conversion can be determined by dividing market capitalization after conversion
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Et,conv by the number of shares outstanding after conversion. Therefore, after con-
version, the CoCo is worth the number of shares the investor receives times the stock
price after conversion.
Ct,conv = Et,conv
s + Ccp
· C
cp
= Et,conv
s cp + C C (15)
The value of equity given conversion, Et,conv, depends on the value of assets At
and debt D, as shown in Eq. 16. If Aa is insufficient to cover debt capital D, the issuer
defaults and the CoCo capital C is used to cover outstanding liabilities.
Et,conv = max(0, (At − D)) (16)
Due to the assumption that μA = r f , it is not necessary to calculate the expected
present value of the equity part for each conversion point, which would require cal-
culating a n-times integral similar to Eq. 11 for each of them. Instead, we calculate
the expected present value of the equity part at maturity T only. Therefore, the pdf for
the event that the CoCo is triggered at any conversion point up to and including T has
to be determined. This would still require the same number of n-times integrals to be
solved but the calculations can be greatly simplified. Using Eq. 11, the probability that
the CoCo has not been triggered up to and including at maturity T can be calculated.
Then, the second part of Eq. 17 is the theoretical expected value of CT,conv, given
that the CoCo has not been converted. The first part of Eq. 17 reflects the uncondi-
tional expected value of CT,conv. Thus, the combination of these two parts indirectly
determines the expected value of CT,conv, which is paid only if the CoCo has been
converted at some point up to and including maturity T .
Vequity
=
⎡
⎢⎣
∞∫
rAT
φ (xT ) CAT dxT
−
∞∫
rA1
∞∫
rA2
· · ·
∞∫
rAn
φ (x1) φ (x2) . . . φ (xn) CAT ,uc dxn . . . dx2 dx1
⎤
⎥⎦ e−r f,T (17)
rAT =
ln
(
D
At0
)
− μa(T − t0)
σA
√
T − t0
CAT =
(
At0 exp
(
μa(T − t0) + σA√T − t0xT
) − D)
s cp + C C
CAT ,uc =
(
At0 exp
(
μa(T − t0) + σA√T − t0(x1 + x2 + · · · + xn−1)
) − D)
s cp + C C
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Fig. 6 Potential coupon rate/conversion price/trigger value combinations resulting in a fair price at par.
At0 = 100, μA = 0 %, σA = 9.76 %, D = 80, C = 10, T = 2 and the coupon frequency is 12 months.
Certain combinations of conversion price and trigger equity ratio would require a negative coupon rate to
result in a fair CoCo price at par and thus are not implementable
Finally, the sum of the values of all three parts is the CoCo’s total value. Thus, if
the probability of conversion was zero, the total value of the CoCo would be equal to
the value of a risk-free government bond with identical structure and coupon rate. At the
same time, Vequity would be zero. A similar situation occurs if there is some probability
of conversion and a variable conversion price that is identical to the actual share price
at conversion. Then, except that the loss of future coupon payments would be higher
than the risk-free rate, theoretically, the CoCo would have the same value before and
after conversion. However, CoCo investors may even benefit from conversion. If the
conversion price was set very low, CoCo investors would be able to take over the issuer
for a price much below the market capitalization.
VCoCo = Vredemption + Vcoupon + Vequity (18)
4.4 Price sensitivities to the design parameters
We now take a closer look at the sensitivities of VCoCo to the three design parameters
mentioned earlier: the coupon rate cC , the trigger equity ratio er∗, and the conversion
price, cp. The sensitivities and dependencies between them can be shown nicely using
the example of a CoCo quoted at par. There is a large set of potential combinations
[cC , er∗, cp] resulting in a fair price equal to the nominal value. We return again to
our simple example. The bank’s total asset value is 100, the CoCo tranche is 10, and
debt capital is 80. Again, the asset yield and the risk-free rate are assumed to be zero,
while the asset volatility is 9.76 %. The CoCo has 2 years remaining until maturity
and the coupon frequency is 12 months. Triggering is possible only every 3 months,
from the date of valuation onward.
As presented in Fig. 6, if er∗ = 0, both the probability of triggering and the expected
present value of equity capital at conversion are minimal. Thus, the conversion price,
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Fig. 7 Percentage shares of redemption, coupon and equity value making up the CoCo’s total fair value.
At0 = 100, μA = 0 %, σA = 9.76 %, D = 80, C = 10, T = 2, the coupon frequency is 12 months
and the CoCo value at par is fair. Certain combinations of conversion price and trigger equity ratio would
require a negative coupon rate and thus are not implementable
cp, has little influence on the CoCo’s price and only comparably minor adjustments
have to be made to the coupon rate cC to maintain pricing at par. On the other hand,
if er∗ is maximal, the probability of triggering is very high. The conversion price, cp,
now has a strong impact on the CoCo’s present value. If cp is very high, the expected
loss in the case of conversion has to be compensated for by high coupon payments.
However, if cp goes to zero, the CoCo investors may take over the company for the
nominal amount of the CoCo only, which may be a rather low price. This reduces
the coupon rate needed to compensate for the investment risk. Due to the fact that the
coupon rate cannot be negative, there are some combinations of high er∗ and low cp
that are impossible.
Splitting up these potential [cC , er∗, cp] CoCo structures into their three value
components illustrates the mechanics discussed above. As shown in Fig. 7, the fraction
the redemption value contributes to the CoCo’s total value depends on the trigger level
and/or the survival probability only. The fraction contributed by the equity part, on
the other hand, relies in a strictly positive way on the trigger level and in a strictly
negative way on the conversion price. The latter aspect is obvious; the former may not
be. This positive relationship is caused by the fact that the triggering probability and
thus the expected value of the equity part is increased by higher trigger levels. At the
same time, the expected share price at conversion increases and, correspondingly, the
value of the converted CoCo capital increases as well. Finally, the contribution from
the coupon value is the residual amount, which can be seen as a compensation for
expected losses in the event of conversion.
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Summing up, these results support the explanations above. Ceteris paribus, a higher
coupon rate always results in a higher CoCo price, whereas a higher conversion price
results in a lower CoCo price. However, the third design parameter, the trigger level,
has an ambiguous impact, depending on the effective coupon rate and the conversion
price. Furthermore, this simple example allows for an interesting interpretation of
yield to maturity, which actually corresponds to the coupon rate if the CoCo is quoting
at par. As can be seen from Fig. 6, depending on the combination [cC , er∗, cp] yields
give rise to a broad range of values. This means that comparing the cost of capital of
CoCos and straight senior bonds based only on the yield to maturity is inappropriate
because the securities’ risk structures are completely different. Such an assessment
must instead be based on the impact on the issuer’s expected return on equity capital.
4.5 Callability
CoCos often have a call feature, meaning that after a specified date, the issuer is given
the right to redeem the CoCo early, at par. This necessitates adding an analysis of
optimal early redemption strategies to the pricing framework. However, in contrast to
evaluation of an investor’s optimal exercise strategies in the case of standard convert-
ibles (Kind and Axel 2005; Ammann et al. 2008), evaluating early redemption by the
issuer is straightforward. According to Brennan et al. (2010), the issuer’s optimal call
strategy for convertibles is to redeem the bond as soon as its value if called is equal to
the value if not called. For example, if the bond exhibits a price above par, its coupon
rate will be too high. Given no transaction cost, the issuer could lower his/her refinanc-
ing cost by calling the bond at par and then re-issuing it (at par) with a lower coupon
rate. Thus, from the call date onward, the maximum price of the CoCo is limited to
its redemption value, which lowers its upside potential compared to a bond without
a call feature. Implementing a call feature in the pricing framework described above
is possible by recursively determining and adjusting the CoCo value distribution at
possible call dates. Due to space constraints, however, the mathematical formulation
is not presented here.
5 Case study: pricing the Credit Suisse BCN
We now apply the pricing model to a real-world CoCo. As discussed above, the Credit
Suisse BCN is the only CoCo issue to date that is not a special case. It was a public
issue and will be converted to shares rather than simply written down if triggered.
Application of the model to this CoCo will illustrate some of the practical issues
involved in pricing such issues.
5.1 Data
For this case study, all the data needed are available from Bloomberg. The sample
period spans from the issue date of the BCN, 17 February 2011, to the end of December
2011. Calculation of the equity-implied asset volatility, σAa , relies on the yearly returns
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Min. Quart. 1 Median Quart. 3 Max.
Ea (CHF) 35,625 9,099 23,639 26,914 34,354 44,932 53,366
Ed (CHF) 40,822 3,208 33,282 40,307 42,478 43,288 43,288
Dd (CHF) 978,246 32,086 936,616 936,616 973,180 1,019,043 1,019,043
Aa (CHF) 1,013,870 32,522 960,408 973,691 1,019,649 1,044,745 1,051,647
σAa (%) 5.30 1.30 3.56 3.85 5.39 6.63 6.90
sCDS, 1 year (bps) 73.23 43.27 23.70 30.16 48.70 113.29 156.11
σAa ,CDS (%) 2.74 0.18 2.37 2.59 2.76 2.88 3.26
σAd ,CDS (%) 3.08 0.28 2.68 2.80 3.00 3.31 3.63
r f,3 months (%) 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.18 0.19
r f,6 months (%) 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.24 0.25 0.27
r f,9 months (%) 0.30 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.38 0.39 0.41
r f,1 year (%) 0.44 0.12 0.28 0.31 0.53 0.54 0.57
r f,2 year (%) 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.57 0.84
r f,3 year (%) 0.40 0.39 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.80 1.13
r f,4 year (%) 0.51 0.37 0.01 0.18 0.36 0.89 1.22
r f,5 year (%) 0.80 0.42 0.24 0.41 0.79 1.23 1.54
VBCN 98.59 5.44 86.76 93.66 101.79 103.37 104.44
Source: own calculations, Bloomberg
during the previous 252 business days and the sample period is extended accordingly.
This period occurred during a global economic downswing, which is clearly reflected
in the numbers presented in Table 3.
Looking at the market capitalization and the book value of equity, the numbers
already indicate a convergence, in line with Assumption 3. The first quartiles and
medians of the two quantities lie at similar levels, but both the third quartile and the
maximum are significantly higher for Ea . On the other hand, the minimum value
is significantly higher for Ed , which is consistent with the theoretical explanations
above.
Interestingly, the implied asset volatility σAa , which is derived directly from the equity
volatility, differs significantly from its CDS-based counterparts, σAa ,CDS and σAd ,CDS.
This difference may be due to the fact that σAa relies on historical data only, whereas
the CDS spreads have a forward-looking character. Another reason may have to do
with the efficiency of the different markets. In the course of her much broader analysis,
Nikolova and Stanislava (2003) comes to a similar finding regarding the difference
in equity- and credit spread-implied asset volatilities. However, default models do
not usually rely directly on implied asset volatilities but adjust them using historical
default data. Summing up, determining the correct asset volatility is the first major
hurdle when pricing contingent convertibles.
Interest rates during the sample period are extremely low but fairly constant. Up
to a maturity of 2 years, rates lie below 1 % for the whole period, and even higher
maturities never have rates higher than 1.6 %. In addition, the volatilities of the lower
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics capital ratios
Variable Mean SD Min. Quart. 1 Median Quart. 3 Max.
er (%) 3.59 0.65 2.80 3.13 3.34 4.14 5.13
T 1 (%) 12.37 2.61 9.00 10.60 11.60 13.90 18.20
Source: Bloomberg
maturity rates are only five to six basis points, which is very low. Finally, compared to
the development of market capitalization, the price of the Credit Suisse BCN is quite
stable. However, the large distance between the minimum and the first quartile implies
that the issue appears to have suffered a substantial drop in price during the sample
period.
Information on the relationship between the equity ratio and the TIER-1 ratio is
needed. Because these ratios are published only quarterly, a corresponding sample
period, spanning from Q1 2002 to Q4 2011 is chosen.
According to the data presented in Table 4, the TIER-1 ratio of Credit Suisse is
substantially higher than its straight equity ratio. This implies that the average risk
weight of assets is very low, possibly significantly below one. This is probably the
result of a rather conservative investment of assets and may be due to the bank’s strong
engagement in the Swiss residential mortgage and corporate loan market.
5.2 Methodology and results
The analysis relies on the three-step pricing framework presented above. However,
several additional assumptions are made to simplify the calculations. First, and sim-
ilarly to De Spiegeleer et al. (2011), the Credit Suisse BCN is assumed to feature a
5-year maturity only. This span is equal to the call protection period of the CoCo.
This assumption removes some of the CoCo’s downside potential because the BCN
would not be repaid after 5 years if the actual market price was below the redemption
value. As a result, the outcome will be slightly too high. Second, conversion of the
BCN is assumed to occur at reporting dates only. Because financial reports usually are
not published exactly at a quarter’s end but with a certain lag, the conversion points
are assumed to fall exactly 1 month after each quarter’s end. Third, the regulatory
trigger is omitted. Determination of the CDS-implied asset volatility involves choos-
ing a recovery rate. Following the long-term empirical studies of Altman and Edward
(2003) and Moody’s (2009), an expected recovery rate of approximately 55 % seems
plausible for secured bonds issued by financials. Fifth, the default point is defined at
98 % of total liabilities.
Given these assumptions, three series of fair prices are calculated based on a bino-
mial approach with 100,000 steps. The first series relies on the asset volatilities implied
by the equity market only; the second and third calculate asset volatility using CDS
spreads. For all series, the dependence of the TIER-1 ratio on the book equity ratio is
assumed to stay the same. Figure 8 presents this dependency graphically.
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Fig. 8 Dependence between Credit Suisse’s equity and TIER-1 ratios 2002–2011. Source: own calculations,
Bloomberg
The intercept of the linear regression is 2.88 %, but the lower border of the corre-
sponding 95 % confidence interval is slightly below 0 %. Nevertheless, this suggests
that if the bank is in financial distress, its TIER-1 ratio will be too high in an economic
sense. The slope of the regression line is 2.73, which reflects the comparably low
average risk weight of Credit Suisse’s assets. The R2 of the regression is a rather low
36.03 %. A further uncertainty is reflected in the huge confidence interval at equity
ratio ranges not represented in the historical sample. At the BCN’s trigger, a TIER-1
ratio of 7 %, this interval varies from a corresponding straight equity ratio of 0 % to
approximately 2 %. This creates a great deal of volatility in the final price estimations
and is one of the major problems when trying to price CoCos in practice.
Looking at Credit Suisse’s book and implied equity ratios reveals a significant con-
vergence during the recent crisis. After falling below the straight equity ratio during
Q3 2008 and Q4 2009, the implied equity ratio often converged perfectly at the report-
ing dates until the end of 2011. This supports Assumptions 2 and 3, at least so far.
However, in the third quarter of 2011, the implied equity ratio fell again—dramatically
so.
Finally, Fig. 9 presents the model outputs for the asset volatility implied directly
by the stock price volatility and those implied by the CDS spreads. The price paths
modeled are approximately parallel and show a significant downturn from May 2011
onward. These downturns are primarily caused by the nearly 50 % drop in the Credit
Suisse stock price between May and August 2011. In the case of Models 1 and 2, this
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Fig. 9 Results for the Credit Suisse BCN. Model 1 relies on asset values and the corresponding volatility
implied by the market value of equity and disclosed debt capital. Model 2 relies on values implied by 1-year
CDS spreads, the market value of equity and disclosed debt capital. Model 3 relies on values implied by
the 1-year CDS spreads, disclosed equity capital and disclosed debt capital
decreased the implied equity ratios and at the same time increased the asset volatility.
Even the prices resulting from Model 3, which relies not on stock price development
but on the credit spreads and the book values only, fell massively during that period.
However, the actual prices of the BCN stayed relatively stable until the end of July
2011 before falling (much less steeply) as well.
The span between the prices resulting from the three models is very large, yet
another indication of how difficult it is to price CoCos. In the case under consideration,
credit markets seem to assume much lower asset volatility than equity markets. To this
point, the CoCo market follows the credit market’s assessment rather than the equity
market’s. However, this interpretation is based on the TIER-1 ratio being linearly
dependent on the straight equity ratio presented above. If the market believed that
the actual trigger asset value was lower or—in the most extreme case—that the BCN
would be triggered only at default, this would actually increase the value of the CoCo.
However, in the case of the Credit Suisse BCN, the regulatory trigger may avoid
this extreme case, which would require a severe manipulation of the TIER-1 ratio.
Nevertheless, this could be why the BCN’s market price did not drop in the same way
as do the modeled prices. Another explanation for the dampened reaction may lie in
the expectation that, for reputation reasons, Credit Suisse would rather recapitalize in
traditional ways than allow conversion occur.
6 Conclusion
This paper discusses the fundamentals of CoCo pricing and presents a general frame-
work for doing so in practice. Similar to existing literature, it is assumed that the
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issuer’s total asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion and that there is a
certain relationship between the actual value of assets and their disclosed value. This
pricing model clearly illustrates the basic mechanics of CoCo pricing and reveals three
major problems that arise when attempting to price TIER-1 ratio triggered CoCos.
First, determination of the TIER-1 ratio is based certain guidelines issued by national
regulators but there is usually some room for discretion. As a result, modeling TIER-1
ratio’s relationship on straightforward book ratios such as the equity ratio may be very
difficult and require detailed information about the issuer’s asset structure. Second,
defining the risk of conversion or, in other words, the probability that the TIER-1 ratio
will fall below the trigger value, is difficult—even if there is a well-defined depen-
dence of the TIER-1 ratio on the straight equity ratio. It seems feasible to assume
that—at least in the case of financial distress—book values reflect economically fair
valuations. However, actual asset values cannot be observed directly, and thus it is
necessary to rely on values implied by either equity or credit markets. Finally, the
stock price at conversion, which determines the value of the block of shares received,
plays an important role. Although the equity or TIER-1 ratio should be reflected in the
market’s valuation of the issuer, this may be only partially the case in practice, either
as a result of market inefficiencies or due to the arguments mentioned above. These
issues are demonstrated in the case study on pricing the Credit Suisse BCN.
In conclusion, every pricing methodology will be afflicted with these problems, thus
making all results subject to a certain degree of uncertainty. What impact this will have
on the development of the CoCo markets remains unknown and strongly depends on
whether future banking regulations require the use of CoCo capital. However, banks
may prefer the more transparent 100 % write-down structures to the classical CoCo
form, which allows conversion of the nominal. This is supported by the structures of
the most recent CoCo issues.
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